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Abstract
In this paper, I start out with a standard political economy of trade policy model
to guide the subsequent estimation of the determinants of trade policy in a developing
country. I carefully test the model with Colombian data from 1983 to 1998 accounting
for endogeneity and omitted variable bias concerns and then expand it empirically in
several directions. I show that it is important to control for the impact of a drastic
trade reform shock that a⁄ects all sectors and disentangle its e⁄ect from preferential
trade agreements (PTAs). I ￿nd that protection is higher in sectors that are impor-
tant exports for preferential partners which may be seen as a stumbling block e⁄ect of
PTAs for Colombia. I also relax the assumption of ￿xed political weights that measure
the extra importance of producers￿welfare relative to consumers in the government
objective. I measure the impact of sectoral characteristics on tari⁄s indirectly through
political weights as a novel alternative to nonstructurally estimating them as deter-
minants of protection. Accordingly, I obtain more realistic estimates for the political
weights further contributing to the literature.
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Although according to trade theory the optimal trade policy for a small open economy
is free trade, in reality, trade protection in small developing nations is higher and more
widespread than the rest. Using a standard political economy of trade policy model, I
start out by showing that protection in a small open economy will be inversely related to
import penetration (imports/domestic production) and import demand elasticity which is a
common result in several di⁄erent models (Findlay and Wellisz 1982; Hillman 1982; Mayer
1984; Grossman and Helpman 1994; and so on). Then, I use this parsimonious model to
guide the subsequent estimations at the 4-digit industry level (ISIC) tari⁄rates in Colombia
from 1983 to 1998. After con￿rming the prediction of the model which is consistent with
the evidence in the empirical literature such as Goldberg and Maggi (1999) for US, Mitra et
al. (2002) for Turkey, McCalman (2004) for Australia, and Karacaovali and Limªo (2008)
for EU among others, I expand the benchmark model empirically in various directions.
First, I control for a unilateral trade liberalization shock which a⁄ects all sectors, to
capture the Colombian experience of drastic trade reform in the early 1990s similar to Chile,
Mexico, Turkey, and India. I incorporate this common shock with an overall reduction in
the additional political weight the government places on producers￿welfare (who lobby for
protection) relative to the welfare of average citizens (who are unorganized).
Second, I relax the assumption of ￿xed political economy weights attributed to produc-
ers and allow them to vary based on three sectoral characteristics that might mark up or
discount these weights: 1) Share of employment in a sector, 2) ￿rm share as a proxy for
concentration, and 3) labor to output ratio as a proxy for labor intensity. I rely on a short
list of variables that were identi￿ed to a⁄ect trade policy in the earlier literature such as in
Baldwin (1985), Tre￿ er (1993), and Gawande (1998). The novelty of the estimation approach
in this paper is that rather than assuming a nonstructural relationship between protection
and these variables, I empirically model them as factors directly in￿ uencing cross-industry
1political weights (and hence indirectly a⁄ecting protection). I ￿nd that political weights are
discounted for sectors with higher share of employment while they are marked up for labor
intensive and concentrated sectors in Colombia. I also obtain more realistic estimates for
the political weights by allowing them to vary across sectors over time.
Third, I consider the impact of the preferential/regional agreements by controlling for the
sectoral share of imports from preferential partners and ￿nd that the protection is higher for
sectors with higher share of preferential imports from the Andean Group. This evidence sup-
ports the ￿ndings in Limªo (2006) for the US and Karacaovali and Limªo (2008) for the EU
who identify a slowing down e⁄ect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on multilateral
tari⁄s. This ￿nding is in contrast with Bohara et al. (2004) for Argentina and Estevadeordal
et al. (2008) for ten Latin American countries. However, given that the proliferation of PTAs
and the rise in their intensity coincide with a period of much unilateral trade liberalization in
these economies, accounting for trade reform as I do in this paper becomes very important.
Finally, I carefully address the potential endogeneity issues in the econometric model
using an instrumental variables approach and perform several robustness checks.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the basic theoretical
framework that guides the estimations and then in Section 3, I develop the econometric
model and o⁄er the empirical extensions as well as discuss speci￿cation issues. In Section
4, I describe the data and present the estimation results and robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
I rely on a standard political economy model of trade policy that can be interpreted as the
reduced form of a model where special interest politics is given micro-foundations like in
Grossman and Helpman (1994). This model is then used as a benchmark framework to
motivate the empirics discussed in the next two sections.
2I assume a small open economy where output and factor markets are perfectly competi-
tive. The numeraire good  = 0 is produced with labor only, 0(0) = 0, whereas the other
goods, () for  = 1, are produced with labor and a sector speci￿c factor (that is
immobile across sectors). The population and world prices of all goods are normalized to
one, 
 = 1 8, and the numeraire good is traded freely. Therefore, the wage rate also equals
one given a competitive labor market and assuming there is enough labor for the numeraire
good to be always produced in equilibrium.
While consumers fail to overcome the collective action problem and organize for free trade
(Olson 1965), speci￿c factor owners who constitute a negligible share of the population1 get
organized and lobby for protection in their own sector. Tari⁄s are assumed to be the only
form of protection for simplicity so the domestic price of nonnumeraire goods is  = 1+￿,
where ￿ stands for both advalorem and speci￿c tari⁄ rates.2












which is a weighted sum of aggregate consumer and producer surplus as well as tari⁄revenue.
() denotes aggregate demand, () denotes aggregate supply, and () = () ¬
() is the aggregate import demand. Assuming away wasteful government expenditures,
the tari⁄ revenue,
P
 ￿(), is rebated back to the public in its entirety.   0 measures
the additional political weight the government places on the welfare of speci￿c factor owner
lobbies relative to an average voter. In the absence of the political weight,  = 0, equation
(1) boils down to a standard social welfare function without lobbying.
Maximizing equation (1) with respect to ￿ and using  = 1+￿ we obtain the following
1This is not a critical assumption. It simpli￿es the analysis such that lobbies only care about the protection
in their own sector and will not lobby against protection in other sectors on the grounds that it would increase
their consumer surplus.
2This is because world prices are normalized to one. Furthermore, trade is balanced through movements
of the numeraire good.
3￿rst order condition for an interior solution

￿
= ¬(￿) + ( + 1)(￿) + (￿) + ￿
0
(￿) = (￿) + ￿
0
(￿) = 0 (2)










where () stands for the elasticity of import demand.3 This expression is similar to those
obtained in various political economy models as shown in Helpman (1997). The tari⁄ rate
for sector  increases in the additional political weight placed on the well-being of producers,
, while decreases in the import demand elasticity, , and the import penetration ratio,
. A tari⁄ is a tax on imports so the deadweight loss from taxing imports is lower for
more inelastic import demand. A relatively larger market for imports creates a greater price
distortion potential putting a downward pressure on tari⁄s, whereas the marginal bene￿t of
a tari⁄ to a producer lobby is higher when it applies to more units.
3 Econometric Speci￿cation
3.1 The Benchmark
As a benchmark, I ￿rst assume that tari⁄s are determined by equation (3) for sectors  =
1 and over years  = 1 which in log linear and error form can be re-expressed as




where ^ ￿ = log ^ . Given the parsimonious nature of the model, to account for other industry
speci￿c characteristics that might make tari⁄s di⁄er across sectors in a systematic way, I
3Import demand elasticity is de￿ned as  = ¬0

 .
4then augment this model with industry ￿xed e⁄ects
log￿ = ￿ + ￿1 log


+ ￿￿2 +  (5)
where ￿ is a 1￿ vector of industry dummies4,  is the error term, ￿ and ￿1 are scalars,
and ￿2 is an  ￿ 1 vector of coe¢ cients.
3.2 Trade Reform
I estimate tari⁄s at the industry level over the 1983 to 1998 period in Colombia which like
many other developing countries (e.g. Brazil, Turkey, India, etc.) went through signi￿cant
unilateral trade liberalization in the early 1990s (see Figure 1).5 The average tari⁄ rate
went from 44% in 1983 down to 14% after the reform and given that there were not any
￿nancial crises during this time period that could potentially interfere with the analysis,
Colombia provides a natural experiment environment for studying trade policy determinants
and trade reform in a developing country. Import licenses were another common measure
used along with tari⁄s prior to trade reform but these were almost eliminated together with
tari⁄ liberalization (Edwards 2001). Therefore, the reduction of tari⁄ protection was not
replaced by a new form of protection. Tari⁄ rates are also better measured and they are
positively correlated with import licenses. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I use e⁄ective
rate of protection (ERP), which is based on value added, as an alternative protection measure
in Section 4.4 and show that the results with tari⁄s hold under ERP.
It is important to account for the common trade reform shock across sectors while I
maintain the hypothesis that political economy of trade policy still matters. The variation
in tari⁄s across sectors is expected to depend on political economy forces even in the face of
4The  column of ￿ is 1 and the rest are zeros.
5Although Colombia is a founding member of the World Trade Organization since 1995, the Colombian
trade liberalization that took place starting in 1990 was not in response to a multilateral process, hence did
not entail reciprocity (World Trade Organization 1996). Yet, the unilateral liberalization that occurred prior
to joining the WTO was recognized as part of Colombia￿ s tari⁄ concessions.
5unilateral trade liberalization that prevails in all sectors. In the late 1980s and early 1990s
there was a change in the economic consensus where old import substitution policies were
abandoned for more liberal trade policies, perhaps with the encouragement of World Bank
research and policy dialogue (Edwards 1997). I model this change in view leading to a trade
reform with a common decline in the additional political economy weight attributed to pro-
ducers, . Edwards (2001) indicates that CØsar Gaviria (President of Colombia from 1990 to
1994￿ the reform period) ￿developed from early on a critical view regarding CEPAL￿ s [Eco-
nomic Commission for Latin America] import substitution development strategies.￿Given
that the political weight  can be viewed as not only the value of contribution by lobbies









, it is plausible to relax the time-invariance of  and
let it change to capture the move away from import substitution (trade reform) that hit all
sectors from 1990 and onwards.
Empirically, I specify the trade reform e⁄ect with a period dummy that measures the
shift in the intercept starting in 1990
log￿ = ￿ + ￿1 log


+ ￿2 + ￿￿3 + ￿ (6)
where  = 1 for  ￿ 1990 and zero otherwise, ￿ is a 1￿ vector of industry dummies,
and ￿ is the error term.6
Based on theory, the expected sign for ￿1 is positive indicating that tari⁄s are inversely
related to elasticity adjusted import penetration ratio, ( ).  points to a common
decline in tari⁄s across sectors due to the trade reform put in place in 1990 and onwards so
￿2 is expected to be negative. In e⁄ect, equation (6) allows the political weight  to di⁄er
6￿, ￿1, and ￿2 are scalars and ￿3 is an  ￿ 1 vector of coe¢ cients.
6before and after the reform eras. More speci￿cally,
log ^  =
n ^ ￿ for   1990
^ ￿ + ^ ￿2 for  ￿ 1990 (7)
Finally, the industry dummies account for ￿xed sectoral characteristics that might explain
further cross-industry variation in tari⁄s that are not already captured by the benchmark
model.
3.3 Political Weights
Several other variables have been identi￿ed as potential factors a⁄ecting protection in the
earlier empirical studies (see Baldwin 1985 for example). Based on this observation, it is
plausible to argue that political weights may vary from one sector to the other (and over
time.) I conjecture that the value of contribution from lobbies and the value of protecting
industries for the government may be discounted or marked up based on sectoral character-
istics. Therefore, I relax the assumption of ￿xed political economy weights across sectors
and empirically model them to vary based on some alternative industry variables:
log￿ = ￿0 + ￿ + ￿1 log


+ ￿2 + ￿￿3 + ￿ (8)
where ￿ (estimating the e⁄ect of the ￿xed political weight on producer welfare, log) is
broken into ￿xed and variable (across sectors over time) portions: ￿0 and ￿ =
P
   .
Here,  is the  factor measuring sectoral variation in political weights. Therefore, the
political weights are estimated as follows




 ^    for   1990
^ ￿0 + ^ ￿2 +
P
 ^    for  ￿ 1990
(9)
The important point to realize here is that rather than arguing for a reduced set of
variables that might directly bear upon protection, I propose using a plausible group of
7variables that might impact the value attached to well-being of producers through protection
granted to them by the government. In that respect, these variables directly a⁄ect the
political weights and hence only indirectly a⁄ect tari⁄s.
Keeping a parsimonious approach, I focus on  = 3 key industry level variables for :
1) Share of employment (ratio of employment in the sector to total employment in the
economy); 2) ￿rm share (ratio of total number of ￿rms in the economy to the number of
￿rms in the sector) as a proxy for ￿rm concentration; 3) industry-level labor to output ratio
as a proxy for labor intensity of a sector.
Intuitively, these three variables are expected to a⁄ect the political weights as follows: 1)
An industry with a higher share of employment commands more votes and may thus be more
likely to be favored by politicians (Caves 1976). However, with more workers, there might
also arise a free-rider problem and therefore a weaker organization to demand protection
in an industry (Tre￿ er 1993). Consequently, the expected sign of the coe¢ cient on share
of employment is ambiguous:  1 7 0. 2) A higher ratio of total number of ￿rms in the
economy to the number of ￿rms in an industry is a proxy for ￿rm concentration. A more
concentrated sector indicates a stronger organizational power asking for protection (Olson
1965) so we expect   2  0. 3) Finally, labor intensive sectors may be favored based on
a social justice motive as they may be impacted more adversely from import competition
(Baldwin 1985). Accordingly, we expect   3  0.
3.4 Preferential Trade Agreements
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) encompassing both Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)
and Customs Unions (CUs) are expected to a⁄ect the MFN tari⁄s that apply to countries
outside the PTA. Karacaovali (2010) shows that once a free trade agreement (FTA) is in
place and it leads to some trade being diverted away from non-member nations into member
nations, external tari⁄s are expected to decline under an endogenous political economy model
of trade policy and FTAs. Bohara et al. (2004) ￿nd that ￿over the period 1991 ¬ 1996...the
8increasing penetration of imports from Brazil and the resulting ￿ decline￿of industries in
Argentina led...to the lowering of external tari⁄s in these industries￿(p. 85). Estevadeordal
et al. (2008) look at ten Latin American countries from 1990 to 2001 and similar to Bohara
et al. (2004) ￿nd that ￿preferential tari⁄ reduction in a given sector leads to a reduction
in external (MFN) tari⁄ in that sector￿(p. 1531). However, Karacaovali and Limªo (2008)
show that the European Union (EU) has reduced its multilateral tari⁄s less in products
imported duty-free from preferential partners but not in products imported from new EU
members. Limªo (2006) ￿nds a similar e⁄ect for the U.S. Therefore, there is mixed evidence
lending support for both the stumbling block and building block (Bhagwati 1991) e⁄ects of
PTAs on global free trade.
Although it is possible that a PTA may exert a downward pressure on external tari⁄s as
predicted in Karacaovali (2010), there might be cross-industry di⁄erences over time in terms
of the e⁄ect of PTAs. In the spirit of the argument in Limªo (2007), we may expect countries
to hold back reducing tari⁄s in sectors that are important for PTA partner countries because
each time MFN tari⁄s are liberalized, the preferential access is eroded. If MFN tari⁄s were
to be eliminated, it would also annihilate the preferential agreements which the countries
presumably value in the ￿rst place. I control for such an e⁄ect of PTAs by including the
share of PTA imports relative to total imports in an industry as an additional regressor in
equation (8). While  takes care of the common decline in all tari⁄s due to unilateral
liberalization, share of PTA imports capture the stumbling versus building block e⁄ects
across industries.
I focus on the Andean Group PTA of Colombia originally established by the Carta-
gena Agreement in 1969 with other founding members Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru.
Venezuela became a member in 1973 while Chile withdrew in 1976. Andean Group is the
second biggest trade bloc in South America after Mercosur and it is the most comprehensive
regional/preferential trade agreement Colombia was involved in for the sample period of
this study. Colombia was also a member of Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)
9which was established in 1980 and was limited in scope. Although it was augmented by
some further bilateral agreements with Chile, Mexico, and Mercosur countries, none of these
agreements provided noteworthy preferential access as compared to Andean Group. Further-
more, the Andean agreement is particularly strengthened to eliminate barriers to virtually all
intra-regional trade coinciding with the period of general trade reform in Colombia (World
Trade Organization 1996).
After controlling for PTA e⁄ects, equation (8) can be modi￿ed as
log￿ = ￿0 + ￿ + ￿1 log


+ ￿2 + ￿3_ + ￿￿4 + ￿ (10)
where _ is the share of imports from Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela to
total imports in industry , year .
3.5 Speci￿cation Issues
All estimations including the benchmark econometric model are potentially subject to en-
dogeneity given the fact that elasticity adjusted inverse import penetration, , (the
main right-hand-side variable) is a function of domestic prices, hence tari⁄s. Therefore, OLS
estimation is expected to produce biased results. As a way to get around the problem of
endogeneity, I use one period lags of all right-hand-side variables. Although this may allevi-
ate the bias, it would not totally eliminate it given the persistence of the dependent variable
(tari⁄s) over time. Therefore, I consider an Instrumental Variables (IV) approach. While
the validity and strength of instruments will be discussed in Section 4.4, here I provide a
brief intuition behind the choice of instruments.
First, I use import unit values as a proxy for world prices at the border which are
correlated with domestic prices by de￿nition but not tari⁄s so they are useful to instrument
for  ()()(). Second, I use a measure of scale (value added/number of ￿rms) as an
instrument for import penetration given that scale is likely to be correlated with ￿xed costs
10of entry to an industry, hence a⁄ect import penetration. However, scale is an inherent
characteristic of a sector and once we account for industry size in the protection equation,
its e⁄ect is only indirect and it can be correctly excluded from the protection equation as
done in Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Third, I
rely on upstream total factor productivity (TFP) to instrument for the TFP of a sector,
hence  (). Productivity in a sector is expected to be a⁄ected by the average productivity
of upstream sectors but upstream TFP is likely to be independent from sector￿ s own tari⁄s.
Despite relying on a theoretical model and addressing several factors that might de￿ne
tari⁄s, the estimations may still su⁄er from an omitted variable bias. Therefore, I use
industry ￿xed e⁄ects in all speci￿cations while the instrumental variables approach is also
expected to reduce such bias. Finally, other econometric concerns are addressed in Section
4.4 after estimation results are discussed next.
4 Empirics
4.1 Data
The data for the estimations cover 1983, 1985, and 1988 through 1998 and the de￿nitions
of all the variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Table A.1. Here, I present
the data sources.
MFN applied tari⁄data are obtained from the National Planning Department (DNP) of
Colombia at the 8-digit product level (Nabandina code), which are aggregated to the 4-digit
ISIC (International Standard Classi￿cation, United Nations) industry level by using simple
averages.7 E⁄ective rate of protection (ERP) ￿gures are also available from the same data
source which I use to test the sensitivity of the results in Section 4.4.
The main production data (total output, value added, number of employees) are available
7I thank Marcela Eslava for providing this data. Using simple shares is common in other papers as well.
Alternatively, one could use production or import shares as weights but such data are not available at the
disaggregate level.
11at the 4-digit ISIC level through UNIDO￿ s Industrial Statistics Database while bilateral and
aggregate imports data are from COMTRADE, UN Statistics Division (again at the 4-digit
ISIC level).
Import demand elasticity is obtained by combining the structural estimates in Kee et al.
(2004) with GDP data from World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators (WDI) and import
data from COMTRADE, at the 3-digit ISIC level. An alternative time-invariant import
demand elasticity measure (3-digit ISIC) is obtained from Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) as
a robustness check. Import unit values (dollars per kilogram) are an average at the 3-digit
ISIC level proxying for world prices at the border and are taken from Nicita and Olarreaga
(2007) as well.
Scale is measured as value added (UNIDO) divided by the number of ￿rms (Eslava et
al. 2004) at the 4-digit ISIC level. Upstream total factor productivity (TFP) measures
the weighted average of the TFP8 (Eslava et al. 2004) of the upstream sectors excluding
itself where weights for the share of inputs per upstream industry is obtained from the
input-output tables at the 3-digit ISIC level from Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). The union
dummy variable which measures labor union activity at the 3-digit ISIC level is obtained
from Quintero (2006) and ￿nally, 4-digit industry level employment hours to compute the
labor to output ratio is from Eslava et al. (2004).
4.2 Descriptives
Table 1 lists the average tari⁄ rates and their dispersion across 4-digit industries for the
main sample. There is a sharp reduction in the average tari⁄ rates starting in 1990 while
the dispersion declines to a lesser extent which can be observed from the coe¢ cients of
variation.9 The same trend can also be observed in Figure 1 which depicts the tari⁄rates at
8TFP is obtained at the ￿rm level using a production function residual approach from a two-stage least
squares estimation and then aggregated to the 4-digit ISIC level using production shares as weights (Eslava
et al. 2004).
9Coe¢ cient of variation (CV) is de￿ned as standard deviation divided by the mean, hence takes into
account the di⁄erences in the magnitude of average tari⁄s across the periods.
12the 4-digit industry level over time. The trade reform a⁄ects all sectors, yet there is cross-
industry variation which I conjecture to be attributed to political economy forces based on
the econometric model developed in Section 3. Therefore, various speci￿cations of the model
are tested formally in the next section. Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for all the
variables used in the estimations.
4.3 Estimation Results
4.3.1 The Benchmark Model and Trade Reform
As discussed in Section 3.5, endogeneity of the main right-hand-side (RHS) variable, elasticity
adjusted inverse import penetration ratio , is a valid concern so I ￿rst con￿rm that
endogeneity is present with a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Then, as an initial step to address
this concern, I use one-period lags of the right-hand-side variables. However, given the
persistence in variables, this will be a weak method to address the endogeneity so I resort to
an instrumental variables (IV) approach next. More speci￿cally, I use the two-step e¢ cient
generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) estimator which is robust to heteroskedasticity
of unknown form due to its use of an optimal weighting matrix (Cragg 1983). I test for
heteroskedasticity using a Pagan-Hall (1983) test and ￿nd it to be a problem so this further
justi￿es the use of an IV-GMM estimator.
Although the estimates will be biased, I present the results from Cragg￿ s heteroskedastic
ordinary least squares estimator (HOLS) in the ￿rst four columns of Table 2 for comparison
with the IV-GMM results in the last four columns. In Columns 1 and 5, I test equation (5)
and in columns 2 and 6, I retest the same benchmark speci￿cation using one period lags
of the main RHS variable and its instruments instead. There is a strong support for the
benchmark political economy model, where elasticity adjusted import penetration is found
to be inversely related to tari⁄s at the 1% level of signi￿cance. This result is in line with
the aforementioned empirical evidence in the literature (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi 1999;
13Karacaovali and Limªo 2008).
Next, I account for the common unilateral trade liberalization reform shock a⁄ecting all
sectors with the trade reform dummy,  which has a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient
(at the 1% level) as expected. Under the HOLS estimations, the R-squared values are
signi￿cantly higher when I control for trade reform.10
4.3.2 Speci￿cation Issues
The results from both HOLS and IV-GMM estimations are consistent in general, albeit with
smaller coe¢ cients under HOLS. However, given the presence of endogeneity, IV-GMM is
the preferred methodology. Hansen￿ s (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions point that
the instruments (import unit values, log of scale, and upstream TFP) are orthogonal to the
error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equations. The probability values for
the Hansen￿ s J test are reported in the last rows of all tables for IV-GMM speci￿cations.
For instance, in Table 2, column 8, under the preferred benchmark speci￿cation with
lagged  and trade reform dummy, the p-value for Hansen￿ s J test is 0.351 so we
fail to reject the validity of instruments. Furthermore, the excluded instruments are jointly
signi￿cant and the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) test, which is robust to heteroskedasticity, rejects
that the model is underidenti￿ed. However, weak identi￿cation may be a concern for IV
estimations in general (c.f. Baum et al. 2007). For the same benchmark speci￿cation, the
Cragg-Donald (1993) statistic is 9.284 which lets us reject the presence of weak instruments
at the 10% level using Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. The ￿rst-stage regressions are
presented in Appendix Table A.3. Finally, the Andersen-Rubin (1949) test (which is robust
to the presence of weak instruments) indicates that the endogenous regressor, , in the
structural equation is signi￿cant at the 1% level.
10Under the IV-GMM methodology R-squared is not a meaningful measure, hence not reported.
144.3.3 Political Weights
In Table 2, columns 5 and 6, I estimate equation (5) and its variant with the one-period lag
of , respectively. As indicated in equation (7), the constant term provides an estimate
for the ￿xed political economy weight, , which is equal to 0.016 in column 5 and 0.008 in
column 6. Similarly, equation (6) estimates are in columns 7 and 8 where I allow the political
economy weight, , to vary before and after the reform capturing the common unilateral
trade liberalization shock in all sectors with a drop in . The estimates for  are 0.104
(0.041) before 1990 and 0.053 (0.030) afterwards in the column 8 (7) speci￿cation. This
indicates that the government values producer welfare 10% more than an average citizen
and this ￿gure goes down to 5% after the trade reform. These estimates, although arguably
small (c.f. Gawande and Krishna 2003; and Imai et al. 2009), are signi￿cantly higher (when
trade reform is accounted for) than the ones in the earlier literature. For example, Goldberg
and Maggi (1999) estimate  to be 0.014 and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) 0.0003
for the US, whereas Mitra et al.￿ s (2002) estimates for Turkey range between 0.010 and 0.013.
We now turn to the estimates for equation (8) where the political weights are speci￿cally
designed to vary across sectors over time based on three sectoral characteristics: 1) Share
of employment, 2) ￿rm concentration, and 3) labor intensity. In the ￿rst three columns of
Table 3, each variable is ￿rst considered one at a time. We see that the political weights
for concentrated and labor intensive sectors are marked up while they are discounted for
sectors with a high share of employment. As discussed in Section 3.3, more concentrated
sectors will have stronger producer lobbies demanding protection so the political weights and
hence protection is higher in them. Labor intensive sectors are more adversely a⁄ected from
increasing import competition so they are given a higher weight and protected more.11 The
expected e⁄ect of employment share is ambiguous, since more workers have a bigger voting
power, yet they might ￿nd it more di¢ cult to get organized. In Colombia, sectors with a
11This result is similar to Yotov (2010) in spirit who ￿nds that in the U.S. politicians attach a four times
higher weight on trade-a⁄ected workers.
15lower share of employment have a bigger weight. All estimates are signi￿cant at the 1% level
in the ￿rst three columns.
Although the negative coe¢ cient for share of employment may seem counterintuitive, it
is highly and negatively correlated with ￿rm concentration so it might indeed be capturing
the lack of organizational power in a sector. As a matter of fact, when we use both variables
in the same speci￿cation (column 5), ￿rm concentration becomes insigni￿cant. In column 4,
I control for the presence of union activity at the 3-digit level along with share of employment
and ￿nd a negative e⁄ect of unionization as well. This ￿nding is actually similar to Matschke
and Sherlund (2006) who theoretically and empirically show that trade protection is lower
when capital owners lobby irregardless of trade union activity but protection is higher when
unions lobby while capital owners do not. In columns 6 and 7 we have the remaining two
combinations and in column 8 we have all three variables plus the union dummy where the
results are similar to the previous ones in columns 1 through 5.
Applying equation (9), we can estimate the political weights that vary across sectors over
time controlling for all three variables. The average political weight estimate before 1990
is 0.246 which decreases to 0.115 afterwards. In Figure 2, the variation in political weights
is illustrated over the sample period. The cross-industry variation is noteworthy. In Table
A.4, I list the highest ￿ve and lowest ￿ve sectors in terms of political weights along with
the average tari⁄ rates at the 4-digit sector level. Prior to 1990, manufacture of musical
instruments sector (ISIC 3902) has a political weight of 0.708, whereas manufacture of drugs
and medicines has 0.145. Furthermore, the variation in these weights is not correlated with
the variation in tari⁄rates indicating that we do indeed capture the e⁄ect of sectoral variables
on tari⁄s indirectly through the political weights.
Mitra et al. (2006) in their search for more realistic estimates for political weights ￿nd
that their estimates of  range between 0.02 and 0.03 when they assume 10% of the pop-
ulation is organized, and they range between 0.21 and 0.42 when they assume 90% of the
population is organized (Table 2, p. 201). In this respect, my approach in this paper not
16only provides a plausible alternative to ￿xed political weights but also produces more realistic
estimates for them as compared to earlier studies in the literature.
4.3.4 Preferential Trade Agreements
In Table 4 column 1, I present direct estimates of equation (8) with an additional variable:
(Lag of) Share of Imports from Andean Group, L._. I ￿nd that in sectors
where Andean Group exports relative to total exports to Colombia are higher, there is
more protection. This result indicates that Colombia tries to slow down the erosion of
preferences in sectors that matter for its preferential partners despite a common unilateral
trade liberalization shock that a⁄ects all sectors. In order to test whether this relationship
holds after the trade reform, I interact the Andean export share variable with the reform
period dummy in columns 2 and 3. I ￿nd that although there is no signi￿cant incremental
e⁄ect after the trade reform (column 2), the relationship still holds (column 3). This is in
line with the fact that preferences were deepened around the same time as the trade reform
(World Trade Organization 1996).
One may suspect whether _ could be endogenous to tari⁄s. The fact that
I use the lag of _ should alleviate such a potential problem. However, I also
speci￿cally test the exogeneity/orthogonality of this variable with a -test (Baum et al.
2007) and con￿rm that it is not endogenous. Furthermore, there does not appear to be a
correlation between tari⁄s and this share so its impact on tari⁄s can be estimated maintaining
the assumption of its orthogonality to the error term.
In columns 4 through 6, I estimate variants of equation (10) where I allow political
weights to vary across sectors over time as in the previous subsection. The results are the
same and the coe¢ cient on _ remains positive and signi￿cant at the 1% level
in all speci￿cations.
The results support the stumbling block ￿ndings for the US (Limªo 2006) and EU (Kara-
caovali and Limªo 2008). However, given that they contrast the building block ￿ndings for
17Argentina (Bohara et al. 2004) and ten Latin American countries (Estevadeordal et al.
2008), my results point to the importance of explicitly accounting for the impact of trade
reform as well as political economy factors on trade policy.
4.4 Robustness
In Table 5, I present the results for di⁄erent robustness checks. In column 1, I use e⁄ective
rates of protection (ERP) as opposed to tari⁄s as the dependent variable and ￿nd that the
results are consistent. ERP measures protection on value added by considering the e⁄ect
of tari⁄s on inputs as well. Since ERP was computed by National Planning Department
(DNP) and I do not have access to its computation procedure, I use this measure only to
check sensitivity.
In column 2, I check the robustness of the results to the use of year e⁄ects instead of the
trade reform period dummy and show that results are not a⁄ected qualitatively. However,
for purposes of this study, it is important to directly account for the e⁄ect of trade reform
which I modeled as a common shock a⁄ecting all sectors due to a change in the government
perception about the value of import substitution policies, as discussed in Section 3.2.
In column 3, I use an alternative time-invariant import demand elasticity measure from
Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) and in column 4, I apply an errors-in-variables correction to this
measure following Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) given that elasticity is a generated
regressor and may be mismeasured. We see that the results are robust to using these alterna-
tive measures and the IV-GMM approach should further alleviate the measurement problem.
Therefore, my original time-varying import demand elasticity measure is the preferred one.
Finally, tari⁄rates in general are censored from below given that they cannot be negative
so in column 5, I test the robustness of the results to IV-GMM procedure by considering
Newey￿ s two-step tobit estimator (IV-Tobit) instead. The results are not sensitive to using
IV-Tobit and also given the fact that all tari⁄ rates are actually positive both before and
after the trade reform in Colombia, I do not expect the potential censoring from below to
18be a problem for my data set.
5 Conclusion
Based on a standard political economy of trade policy model, tari⁄ rates are expected to be
inversely related to elasticity adjusted import penetration ratio in a small open economy. I
con￿rm this ￿nding for Colombia and also expand the benchmark model in several directions.
First, I model a common trade reform shock that a⁄ects all sectors in a developing economy
and leads to a drastic trade liberalization episode. The experience in Colombia is similar
to many other developing countries that have abandoned import-substitution policies and
structurally high protection rates across the board in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second,
I empirically model political weights that measure the extra importance of the well-being of
producers (who are organized) relative to average voters (who are unorganized). This weight
may decrease over time when modeled as a common shock where the government objective
changes and the usefulness of protection as a development policy is downplayed. I relax this
structure further by allowing the political weights to vary across sectors over time and ￿nd
that they are marked up for concentrated and labor intensive sectors while discounted for
sectors with a high share of employment in the economy. The novelty of the approach in
this paper is that I capture the e⁄ect of these sectoral variables on tari⁄s indirectly through
the political weights di⁄erent from the estimations in the earlier literature. Third, I account
for the e⁄ect of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on tari⁄s by controlling for the export
share of the Andean Group countries to Colombia and ￿nd that protection is higher in
sectors which are important for the preferential partners. This is in line with the stumbling
block rationale such that erosion of preferential bene￿ts will be slowed down because the
elimination of preferences would mean the end of the PTA itself.
Given that Colombia experienced a substantial trade reform on a unilateral basis, it is
important to disentangle the e⁄ect of PTAs from the e⁄ect of unilateral trade liberalization
19by explicitly accounting for it. Moreover, one way to solve the puzzle of unrealistically low
estimates of the political weights in the literature may be to relax the assumption of ￿xed
weights and allow them to vary based on sectoral characteristics as I do in this paper.
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YearTable 1. Descriptive Statistics for 4-digit ISIC Level Tariffs over Time 












1983  75  43.698  21.814  0.499  9.865  115 
1985  75  38.355  14.513  0.378  5.890  70 
1988  74  35.691  15.312  0.429  7.017  70 
1989  76  35.308  15.281  0.433  7.017  70 
1990  75  30.129  11.261  0.374  7.017  50 
1991  75  21.315  9.280  0.435  1.646  35 
1992  77  13.371  4.496  0.336  5.000  20 
1993  73  13.456  4.576  0.340  5.000  20 
1994  71  13.396  4.553  0.340  5.000  20 
1995  71  13.312  4.670  0.351  4.324  20 
1996  73  13.649  4.657  0.341  4.783  20 
1997  73  13.726  4.593  0.335  4.783  20 
1998  73  13.789  4.535  0.329  4.783  20 
 Table 2. The Benchmark Model and Trade Reform 
             










                 
Log(Y/M*ε)  0.342***    0.099***    1.013***    0.732***   
  (0.018)    (0.014)    (0.091)    (0.172)   
L.Log(Y/M*ε)    0.284***    0.095***    1.250***    0.461*** 
    (0.017)    (0.012)    (0.164)    (0.112) 
REF      -0.830***  -0.855***      -0.320**  -0.661*** 
      (0.020)  (0.018)      (0.132)  (0.052) 
Constant  -2.401***  -2.261***  -1.194***  -1.176***  -4.163***  -4.862***  -3.195***  -2.268*** 
  (0.097)  (0.104)  (0.068)  (0.067)  (0.248)  (0.454)  (0.546)  (0.336) 
Observations  960  961  960  961  960  960  960  960 
R-squared  0.539  0.469  0.814  0.816  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a 
Hansen’s J p
c  n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  0.597  0.544  0.258  0.351 
Notes:  
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
(3) “L.” stands for one-period (year) lag.  
(4) All specifications include industry fixed effects that are jointly significant but not reported. 
a “HOLS” stands for Cragg’s heteroskedastic ordinary least squares estimator. 
b “IV-GMM” stands for instrumental variable two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator. The 
instruments are import unit values, log(scale), and upstream TFP in columns (5) and (7) and their one-period lags 
in columns (6) and (8). 
c “Hansen’s J p” row reports the p-value for the Hansen’s (1982) J test of overidentifying restrictions for 
instrument validity.         
 Table 3. Political Weights 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
L.Log(Y/M*ε)  0.390***  0.720***  0.529***  0.390***  0.393***  0.271***  0.514***  0.273*** 
  (0.048)  (0.159)  (0.110)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.034)  (0.103)  (0.033) 
REF  -0.676***  -0.548***  -0.520***  -0.676***  -0.674***  -0.628***  -0.530***  -0.627*** 
  (0.033)  (0.071)  (0.058)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.055)  (0.033) 
L.Log(ShEmp)  -0.268***      -0.268***  -0.261***  -0.179***    -0.174*** 
  (0.064)      (0.064)  (0.067)  (0.050)    (0.052) 
L.Log(FirmCon)    0.453***      0.045    0.317***  0.030 
    (0.147)      (0.080)    (0.102)  (0.064) 
L.Log(LabInt)      0.220***      0.205***  0.216***  0.205*** 
      (0.039)      (0.028)  (0.037)  (0.028) 
Union        -0.475***        -0.238** 
        (0.082)        (0.093) 
Constant  -3.137***  -4.954***  -2.404***  -2.663***  -3.309***  -2.360***  -3.697***  -2.233*** 
  (0.347)  (0.991)  (0.329)  (0.332)  (0.454)  (0.273)  (0.661)  (0.373) 
Observations  961  961  961  961  961  961  961  961 
Hansen’s J p
a  0.011  0.698  0.300  0.011  0.012  0.003  0.297  0.003 
Notes:  
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
(3) “L.” stands for one-period (year) lag.  
(4) All specifications include industry fixed effects that are jointly significant but not reported.  
(5) All specifications use IV-GMM (instrumental variable two-step efficient generalized method of moments 
estimator.) The instruments are one-period lags of import unit values, log(scale), and upstream TFP.  
a “Hansen’s J p” row reports the p-value for the Hansen’s (1982) J test of overidentifying restrictions for 
instrument validity.     Table 4. Preferential Trade Agreements 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
L.Log(Y/M*ε)  0.796***  0.769***  0.756***  0.335***  0.578***  0.338*** 
  (0.222)  (0.207)  (0.200)  (0.040)  (0.133)  (0.039) 
REF  -0.590***  -0.645***  -0.707***  -0.621***  -0.544***  -0.620*** 
  (0.079)  (0.070)  (0.060)  (0.034)  (0.058)  (0.034) 
L.ShM_ANDE  1.666***  1.189***    0.681***  1.226***  0.691*** 
  (0.536)  (0.393)    (0.134)  (0.333)  (0.135) 
L.ShM_ANDExREF    0.515  1.401***       
    (0.314)  (0.466)       
L.Log(ShEmp)        -0.224***    -0.219*** 
        (0.054)    (0.056) 
L.Log(FirmCon)          0.388***  0.034 
          (0.134)  (0.067) 
L.Log(LabInt)        0.221***  0.242***  0.221*** 
        (0.030)  (0.044)  (0.030) 
Union            -0.348*** 
            (0.100) 
Constant  -3.444***  -3.336***  -3.213***  -2.796***  -4.305***  -2.578*** 
  (0.711)  (0.656)  (0.616)  (0.305)  (0.915)  (0.406) 
Observations  956  956  956  956  956  956 
Hansen’s J p
a  0.468  0.258  0.222  0.049  0.387  0.054 
Notes: (1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. (2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. (3) “L.” stands for one-period 
(year) lag. (4) All specifications include industry fixed effects that are jointly significant but not reported. (5) All 
specifications use IV-GMM (instrumental variable two-step efficient generalized method of moments estimator.) The 
instruments are one-period lags of import unit values, log(scale), and upstream TFP. 
a “Hansen’s J p” row reports the p-
value for the Hansen’s (1982) J test of overidentifying restrictions for instrument validity.         Table 5. Robustness Checks 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  ERP  YearEff  ε 
ALT  ε 
EIV  IV-TOBIT 
           
L.Log(Y/M*ε)  0.656***  0.090**  0.345***  0.345***  0.695*** 
  (0.165)  (0.035)  (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.152) 
REF  -0.603***    -0.683***  -0.683***  -0.557*** 
  (0.078)    (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.076) 
Constant  -1.408***  -0.989***  -1.865***  -1.861***  -2.973*** 
  (0.497)  (0.110)  (0.203)  (0.202)  (0.484) 
Observations  949  961  912  912  961 
Hansen’s J p
a  0.599  0.007  0.113  0.113  n/a 
Notes:  
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(2) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
(3) “L.” stands for one-period (year) lag.  
(4) All specifications include industry fixed effects that are jointly significant 
but not reported. 
(5) IV-GMM (instrumental variable two-step efficient generalized method of 
moments estimator) is used in columns (1) through (4). The instruments are 
one-period lags of import unit values, log(scale), and upstream TFP. 
(6) In column (1), log(effective rate of protection) is used in lieu of log(tariffs). 
(7) In column (2), year effects are used in lieu of REF. 
(8) In column (3), an alternative, time invariant import demand elasticity 
measure from Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) is used. 
(9) In column (4), an errors-in-variables corrected import demand elasticity 
measure (following Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000) of the column (3) 
elasticity estimate is used.  
(10) In column (5), IV-TOBIT (instrumental variable Newey’s two-step tobit 
estimator with left censoring) with the same instruments is used. 
a “Hansen’s J p” row reports the p-value for the Hansen’s (1982) J test of 
overidentifying restrictions for instrument validity.         Table A.1. Variable De￿nitions
Name De￿nition [Source]
￿ Advalorem tari⁄ rate (%), 4-dig [DNP]
 Total output (000 USD), 4-dig [UNIDO]
 Total imports (000 USD), 4-dig [COMTRADE]
 Import demand elasticity: structural estimates [Kee et al. (2004)] com-
bined with GDP [WDI] and imports [COMTRADE] data, 3-dig
 Average import unit value of goods (dollars per kilogram) entering the
country, 3-dig [Nicita and Olarreaga 2007]
 Value added [UNIDO] divided by the number of ￿rms [Eslava et al.
(2004)], 4-dig
 Upstream total factor productivity (TFP): Weighted average of the
TFP [Eslava et al. 2004)] of the upstream sectors excluding itself where
weights for the share of inputs per upstream industry is obtained using
input-output tables [Nicita and Olarreaga (2001)], 3-dig
 Trade Reform period dummy (intercept shifter) which is equal to 1 for
1990 and onwards, and 0 otherwise.
 Share of employment: Share of the number of the employees in a sector
to total number of employees in the country, 4-dig [UNIDO]
 Firm Concentration: Ratio of the total number of ￿rms in the country
to the number of ￿rms in an industry, 4-dig [Eslava et al. 2004]
 Industry level employment hours as a share of industry level physical
output, 4-dig [Eslava et al. (2004)]
 A dummy variable which is equal to one if there exists labor union
activity at the 3-digit industry level [Quintero (2006)]
_ Share of imports from ANDEAN Group countries (Bolivia, Ecuador,
Peru, and Venezuela) to total imports within a 4-digit ISIC industry
for the sample period [COMTRADE]
￿
 E⁄ective rate of protection (%), 4-dig [DNP]

 Time invariant alternative import demand elasticity measure, 3-dig
[Nicita and Olarreaga (2007)]

 Errors-in-variables corrected measure (following Gawande and Bandy-
opadhyay 2000) of the time invariant alternative import demand elas-
ticity estimate of Nicita and Olarreaga (2007), 3-digTable A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Name  Observations  Mean 
Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum 
Log(τ)  961  -1.668  0.644  -4.107  0.140 
Log(Y/M*ε)  952  1.709  2.209  -4.811  12.450 
L.Log(Y/M*ε)  961  1.754  2.239  -4.630  12.450 
REF  961  0.688  0.464  0.000  1.000 
IMPuv  961  4.832  4.951  0.183  33.031 
L.IMPuv  961  4.812  4.802  0.183  31.470 
Log(Scale)  954  7.368  1.311  3.424  11.965 
L.Log(Scale)  961  7.286  1.322  1.599  11.965 
UpstrTFP  960  1.524  0.137  1.094  2.052 
L.UpstrTFP  961  1.512  0.133  1.094  2.052 
L.Log(ShEmp)  961  -5.009  1.357  -10.905  -2.127 
L.Log(FirmCon)  961  5.120  1.219  1.884  8.763 
L.Log(LabInt)  961  -0.564  0.836  -3.325  1.606 
Union  961  0.712  0.453  0.000  1.000 
L.ShM_ANDE  956  0.118  0.187  0.000  1.000 
L.ShM_ANDExREF  956  0.094  0.171  0.000  1.000 
Log(τ
ERP)  949  -1.165  0.902  -5.266  1.556 
L.Log(Y/M*ε
ALT)  913  1.770  2.323  -4.518  12.198 
L.Log(Y/M*ε
EIV)  913  1.344  2.589  -4.871  12.188 
 Table A.3. First-Stage Regressions  
for the Benchmark Specification 
             
  Table  1-Column (8) 
Specification 
   
REF  -0.240*** 
  (0.067) 
L.IMPuv   0.014 
  (0.028) 
L.Log(Scale)  -0.281** 
  (0.112) 
L.UpstrTFP  -0.766*** 
  (0.255) 
Constant  6.128*** 
  (0.817) 
Observations  960 
R-squared  0.878 
F test of excluded instruments: F(3,879) = 6.08, Prob 
> F = 0.000. 
Kleibergen-Paap (2006) Statistic for 
underidentification: Chisq(3)=22.15, P-val=0.000. 
Cragg-Donald (1993) Statistic for weak identification: 
F-stat=9.28, Stock-Yogo (2005) critical values”: 5% = 
13.91, 10%=9.08, 20%=6.46. 
Andersen-Rubin (1949) test of endogenous regressor 
significance: F(3,879)=14.64, P-val=0.000. 
Notes:  
(1) OLS estimation. 
(2) Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
(3) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.  
(4) The dependent variable is L.Log(X/M*ε). 
(5) “L.” stands for one-period (year) lag.  
(6) All specifications include industry fixed effects that 
are jointly significant but not reported. 
 
 Table A.4. Cross-Industry over Time Variation in Estimated Political Weights for Selected Sectors 
 
  Average Political Weight, ω  Average Tariff Rate, τ 
ISIC 4   Description  83 to 98  <1990  ≥1990  83 to 98  <1990  ≥1990 
3902  Manufacture of musical instruments  0.422  0.708  0.279  0.145  0.282  0.084 
3312  Manfc. of made-up textile goods exc. wearing apparel  0.402  0.590  0.284  0.335  0.534  0.221 
3903  Manufacture of sporting and athletic goods  0.360  0.652  0.214  0.232  0.324  0.191 
3852  Manufacture of photographic and optical goods  0.324  0.430  0.218  0.167  0.233  0.102 
3842  Manufacture of railroad equipment  0.320  0.385  0.239  0.212  0.439  0.111 
3420  Printing publishing and allied industries  0.100  0.160  0.070  0.224  0.360  0.163 
3843  Manufacture of motor vehicles  0.089  0.142  0.063  0.258  0.439  0.178 
3116  Grain mill products  0.089  0.135  0.066  0.252  0.334  0.215 
3211  Spinning weaving and finishing textiles  0.087  0.138  0.062  0.266  0.463  0.179 
3522  Manufacture of drugs and medicines  0.086  0.145  0.057  0.071  0.095  0.060 
 
All  0.158  0.246  0.115  0.232  0.383  0.163 
 